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of  denominational success, and the purpose of  the church’s mission. If  
the essential purpose of  the church is to cultivate significant interpersonal 
relationships, and this can only happen in relatively small groups, then the 
formation of  such groups should be a high priority. In the case of  large 
churches, those with hundreds or thousands of  members, church can happen, 
so to speak, only with the formation of  small groups, churches within the 
church.  
Their conclusions also redirect the focus of  attention when it comes to 
the church’s mission. Some Christian traditions or organizations encourage 
a strong sense of  global identity. They provide information about church 
members in various parts of  the world, especially in places where the church 
is growing remarkably or where church members are facing serious challenges. 
And they emphasize the important role that official church leaders play in 
coordinating its various activities, clarifying its doctrines, and establishing 
uniform policies for the entire membership. What does not get much 
attention by comparison is just what these scholars maintain is vital to the 
church conceived as the body of  Christ, namely, the development of  strong 
relationships within local congregations. If  Brown and Strawn are on the right 
track, something more is needed than the concept that the church is primarily 
a worldwide movement that is identified by a message that is conceived as a 
set of  doctrinal convictions. A collection of  individuals does not constitute 
the church if  it is defined only by a unified organization, commonly held 
beliefs, and similar religious practices. Church truly exists, their observations 
indicate, only where there is genuine community, that is, only where there are 
groups of  Christians who form close caring relationships.
Brown and Strawn do not provide a full-fledged ecclesiology, nor do 
they intend to. The interface between church and society, or between church 
and world, does not come up. Nor does the perplexing phenomenon of  all 
the deeply felt and long-standing divisions within Christianity. We could go 
on. But what they offer as a very specific proposal, namely, that a biblically 
informed concept of  the church must take into account the wholistic view 
that humans are physically embodied and socially embedded, is entirely 
successful.
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What is the appropriate relation between the relative strength of  the evidence 
that supports a religious belief  and the degree of  confidence with which the 
belief  is held? In The Predicament of  Belief Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp 
develop a carefully formulated response to this persistent question. The 
predicament of  which they speak applies to those who find the claims of  
Christianity problematic from the standpoint of  scientific and historical 
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investigation, and yet attractive, if  not irresistible, from a personal standpoint. 
They argue that those who find themselves in this situation can continue to 
believe and still maintain their intellectual integrity. 
Clayton and Knapp distinguish their own position from two contrasting 
alternatives. They want to embrace more of  what Christians have traditionally 
affirmed than those who “may be minimalists in what they believe, but [. . .] 
maximalists in the confidence with which they believe it” (18)—a description 
that brings to mind the position of  a neo-liberal theologian like Schubert M. 
Ogden, for whom theology has no final basis except our common human 
experience, a position that excludes a good many traditional Christian 
affirmations. At the same time, they differ with those who assent to a wide 
range of  traditional Christian claims but are noticeably unconcerned with 
evidential considerations that would render them at all suspect—from fideists, 
for example. 
So, while they embrace the commitment of  liberal theology to render 
the contents of  faith intelligible to the modern mind, they resist the liberal 
tendency to dismiss too quickly various Christian claims which the “modern 
mind” finds problematic. 
These epistemological and doctrinal aspirations account for the most 
important features of  their project. On the epistemological front, they 
formulate a highly differentiated view of  rationality. And on the doctrinal 
front, they conclude that the central claims of  Christian faith exhibit different 
degrees of  credibility. What we have here, then, is a highly nuanced view 
of  the way, or ways, in which believers today can be both responsive to the 
various challenges to their beliefs that arise in the modern world and faithful 
to the central Christian claims that continue to motivate and inspire them on 
a personal level—a position that Clayton and Knapp identify as “Christian 
minimalism.”
When it comes to beliefs, Clayton and Knapp find compelling reasons to 
affirm that infinite or ultimate reality is “not-less-than-personal” in nature, 
that human beings are related to that reality, and that one particular human 
being, namely, Jesus, plays a “uniquely authoritative role” in that relationship 
(136). In contrast, they “stop short of  affirming a number of  the most 
dramatic traditional claims,” in particular, those regarding miraculous divine 
intervention, Jesus’ bodily resurrection, and Jesus’ identity with one of  three 
“Persons” constituting the divine reality (136-137). They are not emphatic in 
rejecting the latter, however, and they admit that their affirmations undergo 
significant revision. 
Christian minimalism differs from traditional belief  not only in the 
content of  what is believed, but also in the manner in which one believes (148); 
and it is here, I believe, that Clayton and Knapp offer their most stimulating 
observations. They describe various ways in which religious believers—not 
just religious belief—can be intellectually responsible. In a chapter entitled 
“Doubt and Belief,” they argue that there are no fewer than six degrees 
or levels of  rationality (111), which they variously describe as forming an 
epistemic scale (128), a typology of  degrees of  rational justification (115-
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116), and “a sufficiently nuanced framework for assessing the rational status 
of  belief ” (118). Each level is characterized by two things: the relative strength 
of  the evidence in favor of  a belief  and the relative confidence of  the believer 
in the truth of  her belief. 
On level one, someone believes something and believes that it is endorsed 
by the relevant community of  experts (RCE). On level two, a person believes 
something even though the community of  experts does not, because she 
believes the community of  experts is mistaken in rejecting it. On level three, 
she believes something which she does not expect the community of  experts 
ever to accept, because her personal experiences make it reasonable for her 
to believe. 
On the first three levels, the believer’s degree of  conviction apparently 
remains constant even though the nature of  the evidence changes. On levels 
four to six, however, this confidence noticeably declines.
On level 4, a person accepts a certain belief  even though she does not 
expect the relevant community of  experts ever to accept it, and is not sure 
herself  that her experience provides enough evidence to justify the belief. 
Nonetheless, she finds the evidence sufficient to render the belief, if  not 
rationally justified, then “rationally permissible.” On level five, the person 
discovers that she does not have good reasons to embrace a certain belief, 
and therefore no longer believes it, but nevertheless still hopes that it will turn 
out to be true. On level six, the person no longer believes something, or even 
hopes that it will turn out to be true, but still finds it helpful, or useful. But she 
may suspend her disbelief  while worshiping with others, and she may have 
occasional moments of  conviction. 
Clayton and Knapp deserve credit for emphasizing the importance 
of  what we might call “responsible belief.” Having good reasons for one’s 
beliefs, and knowing just what level of  justification applies to those beliefs, is 
important. Our most important decisions should be based on reasons that we 
think are good ones (118), and we should realistically and humbly assess the 
strength of  these reasons.
In addition, the authors perceptively acknowledge the difficulty of  
achieving and maintaining responsible belief  and the even more subtle 
difficulty of  assessing one’s level of  belief. While responsible belief  may be 
a worthy ideal, they seem to concede, in practical life it is almost impossible 
to realize. For one thing, there is no way for us to step outside our beliefs 
to compare them to reality itself  (112). For another, human beings are not 
entirely, or even largely, rational. Some care about such things more than 
others, and among those who care, no one can cite a rational basis for 
everything she believes (111). And when it comes to assessing such a personal 
and urgent matter as one’s own religious belief, things are even more difficult 
(118). 
Due to the varying degrees of  justification for religious beliefs (111) and 
the multiple ways in which a rational agent can be committed to a particular 
religious claim (134), the life of  faith is one of  constant flux. People are 
likely to slide up and down the scale of  rationality over the course of  their 
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religious experience (120), and the inventory of  their beliefs that acquire and 
lose justification may be constantly shifting. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
someone will “adhere more strongly” to a belief  that has less justification, or 
is even irrational by her own standards, than to one that has more (120). 
Another noteworthy feature of  their discussion is the fact that Clayton 
and Knapp acknowledge the difference between what Stephen T. Davis 
calls public and private evidence. There is evidence that is available to any 
informed, reasonable person, and there is evidence that is accessible only to 
an individual herself. The stronger evidence may well be of  the latter sort. 
As Clayton and Knapp observe, however, having private evidence is not the 
same as having no evidence at all. In their epistemic scheme, a belief  may be 
responsible, a person may be justified in embracing it, even though it may 
rest on evidence that is accessible only to the individual herself, and not to an 
objective, disinterested observer.
Perhaps the most important qualification they attach to their stratification 
of  belief  is the concluding “reminder” that the epistemic “levels” they 
describe are really “just convenient points along a continuum,” and “for any 
individual believer, the location of  any particular claim along that continuum 
is subject to revision in light of  new arguments, new experiences, and new 
discoveries” (134-135). 
Along with its helpful insights, The Predicament of  Belief  also raises 
several questions. Given the complexity of  our beliefs and the varieties 
of  justification, the expression “continuum” seems preferable to that of  
“levels,” which appears much more frequently. The latter sets up a hierarchy 
of  rationality, according to which some types of  justification are superior to 
others, with the result that beliefs may descend (119), decline (120), even fall 
(126) from higher to lower levels. In light of  the root cognitive metaphor that 
“good is up,” and higher is better,  the connotation is unavoidable that even 
though evidence of  a distinctly personal nature may qualify as “rational,” it is 
decidedly inferior to evidence of  a public nature. 
But suppose we place the various forms of  justification at different 
locations on more or less the same level. Instead of  a hierarchical arrangement 
of  rationality, or “rationalities,” therefore, I prefer that we place the various 
forms of  justification at different locations on more or less the same level. 
This would allow us to regard beliefs that rely on different sorts of  evidence—
public and private evidence, for example—as equally responsible even though 
they derive from different sources. And it would allow people who hold a 
particular belief  for different reasons to be equally rational in doing so.  
Then, too, there is the role that private evidence plays in the lives of  
many believers. The paradigmatic figure that Clayton and Knapp have in 
mind, the person who finds herself  in a predicament, seems to be someone 
who starts from a position of  belief, encounters various reasons to doubt 
those beliefs, and then hopes to find enough evidence to retain them, if  not in 
their original, then in modified form. My suspicion is that this underestimates 
the power of  the initial experience of  faith, which provides both the incentive 
for the believer to pursue this hope and often, in the final analysis, the decisive 
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evidence for her conviction. It may be that faith can weather the storms of  
doubt because it finds enough evidence of  a public nature to dispel the 
doubts, or at least to defuse their power. But one may also find that the power 
of  one’s early experience, the private evidence that planted the seeds of  faith 
to begin with, is sufficient to sustain it during the strongest intellectual gales. 
The account Karl Rahner gives of  his experience will sound familiar to 
many. “I find myself  a believer and have not come upon any good reason for 
not believing. I was baptized and brought up in the faith, and so the faith that 
is my inheritance has also become the faith of  my own deliberate choice, a 
real, personal faith.”
Another reason to question the use of  “levels” language with reference 
to different epistemic situations is that it seems to undervalue an essential 
characteristic of  faith. As generally described, faith exhibits an “in spite of ” 
quality. It involves trust in the absence of  conclusive evidence or proof. Faced 
with overwhelming, or coercive, evidence, one would have no need—indeed, 
there would be no room—for faith. In that case, one’s belief  would simply be 
the product of  the evidence. If  one’s embrace of  certain beliefs involves faith, 
it seems, there must be a distance between what she affirms and what the 
evidence fully supports. What seems to be a relative deficiency from a purely 
epistemic standpoint therefore seems to be an essential feature of  faith. If  
so, then the highest epistemic level in Clayton and Knapp’s scheme is not 
necessarily superior to some of  the other positions they describe.
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s distinction between the “trusting certainty of  
faith” and “absolute theoretical certainty” may be helpful here. Because “faith 
lives from the truth of  its foundations,” it is entirely appropriate for us to 
assess the evidence that supports the claims of  faith. But since true faith 
consists in the “total committal of  one’s existence in the act of  trust,” we 
distort the nature of  faith if  we seek to extend this theoretical credibility into 
“an absolute theoretical certainty.”
However tempting it is to tweak their formulations, the fact remains that 
Clayton and Knapp provide a wonderfully nuanced account of  responsible 
belief. I can’t recall any discussion of  religious epistemology that is more 
sensitive than theirs to the complex experience of  those who find themselves 
grasped both by the power of  religious commitment and the summons to 
intellectual responsibility. The authors have placed us all in their debt. 
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A range of  environmental issues have increasingly challenged Christians to 
consider the appropriate balance between consumption and preservation of  
limited resources, given the declining condition of  our sinful planet. Entrusted 
is a collection of  23 articles that offer concise yet comprehensive introductory 
responses to these pressing issues. Under the editorial leadership of  Dunbar, 
Gibson, and Rasi, a group of  authors with diverse backgrounds (including 
